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ABSTRACT
Mastering global challenges such as the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic requires 
implementing effective responses at various social levels. Leadership teams 
(governmental, industrial) need to integrate available information to introduce 
effective regulation and update their decisions as new information becomes 
available. Groups (families, peers, teams) need to act persistently, even when 
these actions oppose members’ individual short-term interests. Moreover, indi-
viduals need to stay calm and act diligently, while dealing with emotions of 
threat and resisting counterproductive social influence. Our research pro-
gramme on implementation intentions at social levels suggests that collective 
if-then plans facilitate goal attainment for teams, groups, and individuals in 
social contexts. We therefore analyse how if-then planning can help master 
global human challenges such as the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic.
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“Jetzt zu dem, was mir heute das Dringendste ist: Alle staatlichen Maßnahmen 
gingen ins Leere, wenn wir nicht das wirksamste Mittel gegen die zu schnelle 
Ausbreitung des Virus einsetzen würden: Und das sind wir selbst.”
[“Now let us turn to what is most important to me today: All government 
action would be in vain if we would not employ the most powerful measure 
against the fast spread of the virus: And this is us.”]
Angela Merkel, German Chancellor (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 March 2020)
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The 2020 Coronavirus pandemic first and foremost required behavioural 
responses: Technical intervention was costly, laborious, or simply not avail-
able when it was needed. For instance, even though the development of an 
effective vaccine against SARS-CoV-2, the virus causing the COVID-19 
respiratory disease, commenced at an unprecedented speed (Thanh Le 
et al., 2020), a product usable at scale was still a month away when finalising 
this review in November 2020. Changing everybody’s behaviour was there-
fore the only immediately available option during the Coronavirus pandemic 
(for readability, we refer to the SARS-COV-2 pandemic and the resulting 
COVID-19 disease conjointly as Coronavirus pandemic). Governments and 
CEO boards needed to pass legislation and set rules to protect citizens and 
employees. Families and peer groups needed to change their behaviours and 
persistently stick to these rules even when there are personal costs. And 
individuals needed to change their behaviours even when the overwhelming 
emotions of threat and increasing maladaptive social influence made it hard 
to think clearly. Social and behavioural sciences can help tap into the human 
capability of changing behaviour swiftly and wilfully (Van Bavel et al., 2020), 
and this is particularly true for the thriving field of motivation science. Here, 
we discuss our programme of research on a motivation science intervention 
that can help promote resilient responses required during a pandemic: 
planning at social levels.
The problem
The challenges of the Coronavirus pandemic were manifold but we focus on 
three key levels, which are involved when responding to a global pandemic: 
Teams in leadership positions, such as governments or CEO boards, make 
decisions on regulations; groups, such as families or partners, implement 
these regulations; and individuals, such as family members or spouses, 
regulate their actions accordingly. It is important to note that these levels 
interact with one another and other challenges can arise as well. The point we 
seek to make is that each of these three levels faces specific challenges, and 
considering these social levels thus is key to responding effectively during 
a pandemic.
Teams in leadership positions made important decisions during the 
Coronavirus pandemics, and a key challenge for such teams was managing 
the wealth of information as it became available (Thürmer, wieber et al., 
2020a). Scientists from different disciplines and different global agencies 
contributed their knowledge and their assessment of the situation (e.g., on 
whether and when to wear face masks) and team members were exposed to 
different sets
of information. Accordingly, teams had access to more information than 
a single individual, giving teams the potential to make highly informed 
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decisions. Unfortunately, teams often do not integrate the available informa-
tion (e.g., insights from epidemiologists, health care professionals, and public 
administration), leading to suboptimal decisions (Schulz-Hardt & Mojzisch, 
2012; Stasser & Titus, 2003; Thürmer et al., 2018). But even when a decision 
had been reached, new information became available continuously as the 
situation evolved (e.g., new research indicated that wearing facial masks in 
public is highly beneficial). Teams thus needed to evaluate their decisions 
against today’s new facts constantly. Unfortunately, teams are also hesitant to 
revise their decisions in the light of new information (Sleesman et al., 2017).
The societal groups that make up our personal life (families, partners, 
roommates) eventually needed to implement many of the proposed mea-
sures. Families had to stay home together instead of arranging play-dates 
for the kids, partners had to cancel their date-nights, and roommates had 
to learn how to share their flat 24/7. All these behaviours are challenging 
because they require persistence and often are uncomfortable. They 
require putting the group’s interests over one’s immediate self-interest 
(Kerr, 1983, 2013; Van Lange et al., 2013). But when actions become 
uncomfortable or costly in the long run, people tend to give up on their 
goals (Klinger, 1975).
Even when individuals are committed to implementing all the necessary 
actions, overwhelming emotions of threat and inappropriate social influ-
ences easily derail goal pursuit. The individual experience of threat entails 
powerful emotional and cognitive responses (Jonas et al., 2014). Specifically, 
the protection of the self can take precedence over socially constructive goals 
when under threat, leading to so-called self-defeating behaviours (Kopetz & 
Orehek, 2015). For instance, thinking of the threat of an infection may lead 
to actions that seemingly protect me, such as hoarding medical equipment, 
but endanger medical facilities. Individuals moreover easily lose sight of their 
goals when exposed to maladaptive social norms (i.e., others’ expectations or 
behaviours). For instance, I might have a reasonable shopping list with only 
one bottle of disinfectant on it. But when I see that everybody is buying 
multiple bottles, I will also try to get as many as possible. While there are 
excellent reviews on individual action control (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2017; 
Hofmann et al., 2012; Sheeran & Webb, 2016), substantially fewer studies 
have investigated how to improve action control at social levels (but see 
Gagné, 2018). In the present review, we therefore focus on our programme of 
research on collective planning as an effective means to improve joint goal 
attainment.
Towards a solution: if-then planning at social levels
A basic intuition that many scientists and the general public adhere to is that 
people need to be highly motivated (i.e., have a strong commitment) to have 
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a chance to meet their set goals. This is certainly true, although a strong goal 
commitment is just a necessary first step but by no means a sufficient 
condition. Systematic research shows that even those strongly committed 
to their goals often fail to attain them (Sheeran & Webb, 2016), while those 
who lack commitment never do so (Sheeran, 2002). To reach one’s goals it is 
also necessary to prospectively plan how to implement them (Gollwitzer, 
1993, 1999, 2018). A family with the goal “We want to socially distance” may 
additionally form the if-then plan “And if we go shopping, then we will stay 
at least 2 meters away from other people.”
An abundance of research indicates that individuals benefit greatly from 
making such additional if-then plans (i.e., forming implementation inten-
tions; IIs) that spell out exactly when, where, and how to act to reach one’s 
goal (meta-analyses covering different behavioural domains by Adriaanse, 
Vinkers et al., 2011; Bélanger-Gravel et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015; Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran, 2006; McWilliams et al., 2019; Silva et al., 2018; Toli et al., 2016; 
Vilà et al., 2017; & Webb et al., 2012). A recent meta-analysis of meta- 
analyses integrated many of these reports and found a medium effect size 
of d = .54 (Keller et al., 2020). In fact, in a recent study on reducing snacking 
habits, if-then plans had similar effects as financial incentives, and these 
effects of if-then plans lasted longer than those of financial incentives 
(Achtziger et al., 2019). Moreover, so-called collaborative implementation 
intentions can even support complementary actions that two people jointly 
perform (e.g., breast self-examination; Prestwich et al., 2005; or exercise, 
2012; review by Prestwich & Kellar, 2014). In the context of the Coronavirus 
pandemic, it should be pointed out that this effect size is comparable to 
typical effect sizes of drugs on the symptoms of diseases that they have been 
designed for (Leucht et al., 2015). A behavioural if-then planning interven-
tion to curb a pandemic may thus not only be readily available but also highly 
impactful.
As our analysis of the challenges during the Coronavirus pandemic shows, 
many of the needed behaviours were not performed by individuals in isola-
tion but by teams, groups, and individuals in social contexts. This is not 
surprising, as humans are highly dependent on each other for survival (e.g., 
Sober & Wilson, 1998), and therefore perform tasks and make decisions 
together (Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Tindale & Kameda, 2017). Regarding teams 
and groups, the question arises how these social entities can act most 
effectively.1Teams and groups are assemblies of mutually interdependent 
members, seeking to attain a common goal. Building on the literature on 
group cognition (Hinsz et al., 1997; Levine & Smith, 2013; E. R. Smith & 
Semin, 2004), we assume that actions are distributed across members. In 
1While acknowledging the importance of group identification for collective actions (Sassenberg & Woltin, 
2008), we are most interested in the interactive aspects of groups.
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other words, groups act to attain their goals (von Cranach et al., 1986) by 
performing tasks (taskwork) and coordinating their actions (teamwork; 
Marks et al., 2001). In line with the view that group actions go beyond 
merely performing the task at hand, teamwork behaviours have a great 
impact on team effectiveness (Crawford & Lepine, 2013). But even when 
individuals strive for their own goals, they are susceptible to the impact of 
others.
The question regarding planning then is: Is collective planning possible 
and effective? We define collective planning parsimoniously as a plan refer-
ring to the team or group. Thereby, collective plans refer to the social unit 
(e.g., we, us, ours; a “We-plan”) and individual plans refer to the individual 
(e.g., I, me, mine; an “I-plan”). Classic implementation intentions refer to the 
individual (e.g., “And if I encounter situation S, then I will show response R!”), 
and we therefore recently introduced a new type of plan that refers to the 
group: collective implementation intentions (cIIs; e.g., “And if We encounter 
situation S, then We will show response R!”) (Thürmer et al., 2015a). When 
forming such “We-plans” or cIIs, group members specify when, where, and 
how the group wants to act towards set goals by specifying opportune 
situations and goal-directed actions.
We started our research on We-plans as part of the interdisciplinary 
research group limits of intentionality at the University of Konstanz. Our 
reasoning was the following: At the individual level, if-then plans are effec-
tive because they unequivocally spell out when, where, and how to act. As 
these plans always refer to the individual, there is also no question who ought 
to act (i.e., the person making the plan). Consequently, according to our 
quick and dirty reasoning, specifying the response in relation to a social unit 
should diminish the accuracy of the plan and thus disrupt its positive effects.
Our first empirical results proved us wrong, however. Groups with col-
lective if-then plans made better decisions (Thürmer et al., 2015b) and were 
also more likely to revise their decisions in the light of new information 
(Wieber et al., 2015a). Delving into the rich literature on small groups soon 
made us realise why collective plans were so effective. Group members can 
pursue collective goals (e.g., Kramer et al., 2013; Weldon & Weingart, 1993), 
and humans are well-adapted to acting jointly with others (Sebanz et al., 
2006). Accordingly, when it comes to setting goals, the simple distinction 
between We and I can make a big difference (Kleingeld et al., 2011; Mitchell 
& Silver, 1990). In one set of studies (van Mierlo & Kleingeld, 2010), We- 
goals led to choosing cooperative task strategies but I-goals to more compe-
titive strategies. In a sense, group members with strict ego-centric I-goals were 
agnostic to the needs of the group. As our first studies indicated (Wieber 
et al., 2012), We-plans seemed to be effective. We soon turned to the 
differences between We-plans and I-plans. Our argument is that the We/ 
I-distinction is also important for the prospective planning of one’s goal 
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striving. Referring to the group in a We-if-then plan should increase focus on 
the group and should thereby help teams and groups to strive for their goals 
more effectively, while individual if-then plans may or may not lead to 
behaviour directed towards attaining collective goals. In this review, we 
report research that tested the assumption that collective-focused goal striv-
ing should be particularly helpful when all members’ contributions are 
needed, using three representative situations: First, we report research indi-
cating that teams with cIIs were more likely to integrate socially distributed 
information in their decisions and to consider temporally distributed infor-
mation to later adjust their decisions. Second, we report research indicating 
that group members with cIIs were more likely to cooperate at a personal 
cost and to persist despite discomfort to attain group goals. Third, we report 
research indicating that individuals with IIs refrained from creating excuses 
for a threatening task, and group members with a cII managed to stick to 
their shopping list even when the social context promoted impulse buying.
Planning and team decisions
Important decisions are often made by teams in leadership positions 
(Thürmer, wieber, et al., 2020a). For instance, parliaments debate legislation, 
board of directors supervise organisations, and governments govern coun-
tries. And when one person makes the final decision (e.g., the president in 
many presidential democracies), even those decisions are ideally influenced 
by a team jointly working on the issue (Tindale & Jeremy, 2020). The benefits 
of making these decisions in teams are potentially larger when information is 
socially distributed (i.e., different team members have complementary exper-
tise). For instance, with regard to the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, epide-
miologists, medical doctors, and public health experts jointly contributed to 
understanding whether and how wearing masks reduces the risk of infec-
tions. Policy makers had to gather and integrate this information to make the 
best decisions possible. Moreover, in evolving situations, new information 
may emerge over time, and teams thus may face temporally distributed 
information. In the case of wearing masks, initial evidence for their effec-
tiveness was lacking but some scientists suspected potential benefits and 
many countries accordingly introduced respective measures – with apparent 
positive consequences (Greenhalgh et al., 2020; Klompas, Morris, Sinclair 
et al., 2020; World Health Organization, 2020a). Still, some research sug-
gested that masks may pose additional risks such as self-infections from 
touching one’s face to adjust the mask (Klompas, Morris, Shenoy et al., 2020; 
World Health Organization, 2020b, 2020c). In fact, the World Health 
Organisation explicitly stated that their guidelines “will be revised as more 
data become available” (World Health Organization, 2020c, p. 1). Policy 
makers thus needed to update their decisions continuously, a task that 
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groups commonly do not master well. In two sets of studies, we tested 
whether if-then planning can help teams update their decisions when new 
information emerges.
Planning decisions to integrate socially distributed information
A common reasoning for using teams to make decisions is that different people 
can contribute their perspectives, thereby allowing for more informed deci-
sions. For instance, in the context of the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, different 
members of a task force were able to bring unique expertise to the table, such as 
economic, medical, and epidemiological information. A basic intuition then is 
that such decision-making teams can make better decisions than each indivi-
dual could alone. From an informational point of view, teams have this 
potential to make better decisions when at least two conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) Members can share initially unshared information and thus learn from 
each other, and (b) integrating all this information available to the team leads 
to a different (and better) decision than those made by each individual alone 
(Schulz-Hardt & Mojzisch, 2012). Decision contexts that fulfil these conditions 
are referred to as hidden profile problems (Stasser et al., 1989), because the best 
alternative is initially hidden from each individual member. Unfortunately, 
teams routinely disregard unshared information – even if it comes up during 
discussions (Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 1997; Mojzisch, Grouneva, & Schulz- 
Hardt, 2010; Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2010) and instead rely on their com-
mon knowledge (i.e., shared information; Tindale & Kameda, 2000; Tindale & 
Sheffey, 2002). Teams thus make suboptimal decisions in hidden profile situa-
tions (Lu et al., 2012; Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009).
We (Thürmer et al., 2015b) reasoned that if-then planning may help 
teams in such situations. Individual if-then plans (IIs) are known to help 
break routines (Aarts, Dijksterhuis & Midden, 1999) and can trigger delib-
erating about one’s decisions (Doerflinger et al., 2017; Henderson et al., 
2007). Referring to the team in a We-if-then plan (cII) should thus help 
teams consider crucial socially distributed information (i.e., initially 
unshared information) and improve decisions in hidden profile situations.
We tested this prediction in an interactive laboratory experiment with 
university students (N = 28 triads, i.e., 84 participants). We asked teams of 
three students to make four decisions. As real-world decisions usually have 
consequences for decision makers, we promised a monetary reward for each 
correct decision. Teams were then randomly assigned to a cII condition or 
a control condition. Teams in the cII condition specified a critical situation 
(coming to a decision) and a helpful strategy (reviewing available informa-
tion), and linked the two in an if-then format: “And when we finally take the 
decision sheet to note our preferred alternative, then we will go over the 
advantages of the non-preferred alternatives again.” Teams in the control 
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condition added the same response strategy to their goal but without the if- 
then link: “We will go over the advantages of the non-preferred alternatives 
again.” Teams then worked on three hidden profile decisions. For each 
profile, team members first received individual information pointing to 
a suboptimal decision alternative (Table 1). After studying their materials 
individually, teams gathered and discussed which alternative to choose, with 
a time limit of up to 6 minutes. We recorded and coded the team discussions 
according to well-established procedures (see Thürmer et al., 2018). At the 
end of their discussion, teams marked their preferred alternative on 
a decision sheet. In line with prior research, teams largely failed to solve 
the hidden profile decision cases (6% correct decisions). However, we 
observed an effect of the planning condition: While none of the teams in 
the control condition solved any of the hidden profiles (0% cases solved), 
approximately one third of the teams in the cII condition solved at least one 
case (12% cases solved, see Table 2). With respect to the recorded discus-
sions, teams in the cII condition indeed recapitulated more information, 
especially crucial, previously unshared information. Thus, the cII indeed 
improved hidden profile decisions, apparently by enhancing the considera-
tion of unshared information.
To replicate these effects under more controlled conditions, we conducted 
a second laboratory experiment with individual participants (N = 51 students). 
Design and procedures were largely identical to the interactive study, with the 
key difference that participants did not take part in a team discussion. Instead, 
they followed an animated team discussion (with one avatar representing 
them), during which all available information came up (see Figure 1). Again, 
participants who had formed the cII to review key information made better 
decisions (48% cases solved) than participants who only had included this 
strategy in an additional goal (control condition; 18% cases solved, Table 2).
None of the decision cases studied in our past research dealt with public 
health issues, such as the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic. However, many of the 
characteristics of these decision cases are likely to be similar. First, information 
during pandemics is socially distributed among members of a team. Our 
findings indicate that the cII to review information indeed facilitated using 
such distributed information effectively. Second, decisions during a pandemic 
are made under time pressure. Our interactive laboratory experiment imposed 
a strict 6-minute time limit on teams and the cII did facilitate decision making 
under these conditions. Third, decisions during a pandemic put people, 
companies, and nations at stake. Even though we cannot impose such high 
stakes in the laboratory, all hidden profile decisions were incentivised. Our 
results thus indicate that cIIs may improve decisions even when decision 
makers are already highly motivated to make a good decision.
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Planning decisions to integrate temporally distributed 
information
The 2020 Coronavirus pandemic was an evolving situation and thus posed 
a second challenge for decision makers, that is, information only became 
Table 1. Information distribution prior to the discussion in hidden profiles (unshared 
information is crucial, Experiments 1 and 2). Reprinted by permission from Wiley, 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (Thürmer et al., 2015b).
Alternative
Type of information Best Second Third
Hidden profile cases (Experiments 1 and 2)
Shared information
Positive 0 3 6
Neutral 3 0 0
Negative 3 3 0
Unshared information
Positive 9 3 0
Neutral 0 6 3
Negative 0 0 6
Total pre-discussion information per participant
Positive 3 4 6
Neutral 3 2 1
Negative 3 3 2
Total information available to the team
Positive 9 6 6
Neutral 3 6 3
Negative 3 3 6
Note. Shared information items are given to each group member prior to the discussion; unshared 
information items are just given to one group member prior to the discussion.
Table 2. Decision quality in hidden profiles (unshared information is crucial) and manifest 
profiles (unshared information is trivial), and unshared information recapitulated by 
condition. Reprinted by permission from Wiley, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 




intention χ2 p φ
Experiment 1: Decisions after pre-scripted discussions  
(N = 51 individuals)
Number of optimal 
decisions: hidden profile
4 out of 22 (18%) 14 out of 29 (48%) 4.96 .03 .31
Experiment 2: Decisions in interactive group discussions 
(N = 28 triads)
Number of optimal 
decisions: in 3 hidden 
profiles
0 out of 42 (0%) 5 out of 42 (12%) 5.32 .02 .25
Percentage of mentioned, 
previously unshared 
advantages of the best 
alternative reviewed
20% (SD = 27%) 31% (SD = 34%) 4.31 .04 –
Number of optimal 
decisions: manifest 
profile
13 out of 14 (93%) 14 out of 14 
(100%)
1.04 .31 –
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available over time. This means that a decision that was once wise later turns 
out to be suboptimal. Examples from the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic 
include the recommendation to use facemasks in public (initially not advi-
sable to later advisable), the necessity to close schools (initially not necessary, 
then necessary, as of November 2020 not necessary), and the stance on 
border controls and closures (open borders to closed borders to open 
borders). And, eventually, all costly restrictions need to be lifted when they 
no longer seem necessary. Thus, even when a team manages to share and 
integrate available information initially, it has to revise this decision when 
new information becomes available.
Teams also fail to heed such temporally distributed information and stick to 
their investment decisions or even increase their investment (i.e., escalate their 
commitment; Molden & Hui, 2011; Sleesman et al., 2012, 2017). Recent research 
has, for instance, demonstrated that medical teams may fail to terminate 
a patient’s treatment that turns out to be ineffective (Turpin et al., 2019). 
Among the many determinants of the escalation of commitment (Sleesman 
et al., 2012; Staw & Ross, 1989), self-justification processes play a prominent role 
(Staw, 1976). According to this perspective, people escalate their commitment to 
avoid the dissonance between choosing an initial investment and the realisation 
that this was a mistake. In line with this hypothesis, it has been found that the 
failure to reduce commitment in response to negative feedback is positively 
related to (a) being personally responsible for the initial decision, (b) having 
previously expended resources (i.e., sunk cost, time invested), and (c) feeling 
personally threatened by the negative feedback (i.e., ego threat). We therefore 
reasoned that teams may find it difficult to distance themselves from their initial 
decision. But as if-then planning can be used to promote complex cognitive 
responses (Doerflinger et al., 2017; Martiny-Huenger et al., 2011), we argued that 
teams can resort to collective plans to take an onlookers perspective.
To test this assumption, we conducted two experimental studies with inter-
active teams (Exp. 1: N = 39 triads, i.e., 117 participants; Exp. 2: N = 46 triads, i.e., 
138 participants; Wieber et al., 2015a). We expected that forming cIIs regarding 
when, where, and how to act (i.e., making We-if-then plans) should facilitate 
initiating a self-distancing response (i.e., taking the perspective of neutral obser-
vers). In both studies, we asked teams of three students to make decisions 
regarding a Kindergarten project as a city council committee (Haslam et al., 
2006; see also Dietz-Uhler, 1996). The scenario commenced in three consecutive 
phases. In each phase, teams received information on the actual state of the 
project, discussed it, and made a unanimous investment decision. The informa-
tion received in Phase 1 was unanimously positive (4 pros, 0 cons) and thus 
supported the initial investments; however, the information in Phase 2 was 
mixed (2 pros, 2 cons) and in Phase 3 it was mostly negative (1 pro, 3 cons), 
calling for more moderate investments. The amount of money invested in the 
project at the end of each phase served as the dependent variable.
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Before working on the decision scenarios, teams were randomly assigned 
to different planning conditions. In Study 1, all teams formed the goal “We 
want to make the optimal investment decision in each phase!” and then 
added the strategy to take an observer’s perspective in one of two formats (cII 
vs. control). Teams in the cII condition added an implementation intention 
“If we are about to make an investment decision, then we will judge the 
project as neutral observers who are not responsible for earlier decisions!”; 
teams in the control condition added a self-distancing goal intention without 
specifying a critical situation “We want to judge the project as neutral 
observers who are not responsible for earlier investment decisions!”.
In Study 2, teams were randomly assigned to one of three conditions 
(control: no goal or plan, goal intention only, goal intention plus implemen-
tation intention), with the goal and the plan being identical to those used in 
Study 1. This way, we sought to test whether only the goal to make good 
decisions would be sufficient to de-escalate commitment. Moreover, we 



























Figure 2. Escalation of commitment, Study 1: mean investment (percentage of the 
available budget) by intention (N = 39 triads) in Phase 1 (positive project outlook), Phase 
2 (mixed project outlook), and Phase 3 (negative project outlook). Error bars represent 
standard errors. Adapted from Wieber et al. (2015a). Copyright pertains to the authors. 
Adapted with permission.
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the current project would be available to other important projects. This way, 
we sought to make it easier to justify lower investments.
In line with our assumptions, teams with the self-distancing cII reduced 
their high levels of investment (Study 1, see Figure 2) or maintained their 
moderate levels of investment (Study 2, see Figure 3) after negative feedback. 
Teams that had merely formed goal intentions, however, escalated even 
though they had added self-distancing goal intentions (Study 1) and this 
level of escalation was comparable to control teams without such a goal 
(Study 2).
Our line of research on decision-making and cIIs raises important impli-
cations for decision makers during the Coronavirus pandemic. Preparing to 
consider all available information before making a decision as well as later 
adjusting decisions was crucial for effective management of the 2020 
Coronavirus pandemic as well as a speedy recovery of societies afterwards. 
Our research shows that cIIs can facilitate team decisions by increasing the 




























Figure 3. Escalation of commitment, Study 2: mean investment (percentage of the 
available budget) by intention (N = 46 triads) in Phase 1 (positive project outlook), Phase 
2 (mixed project outlook), and Phase 3 (negative project outlook). Error bars represent 
standard errors. Adapted from Wieber et al. (2015a). Copyright pertains to the authors. 
Adapted with permission.
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moreover, cIIs facilitate the use of temporally distributed information to 
revise past decisions (Thürmer et al., 2015b; Wieber et al., 2015a).
a)
b)
Figure 4. a) No-alliance (outsider) payoff matrix. In this prisoner’s dilemma task, the 
regular price (A) can be considered to be the cooperative decision due to the higher 
joint payoff (A,a > B,b); the discount price (B) can be considered to be the defect 
decision due to the higher individual payoff (B,a > A,a; B,b > A,b). Adapted from 
Thürmer, Wieber et al. (2020b) based on the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC 
BY). 
b) Alliance payoff matrix. alliance payoffs are payed to the players 50/50, and this 
matrix thus leads to identical payoffs to the no-alliance matrix. However, alliance 
payoffs visualise the difference in joint payoffs according to each combination of 
decisions. Adapted from Thürmer, Wieber, et al. (2020b) based on the Creative 
Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
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Planning and group behaviour
The decisions regarding the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic needed to be 
implemented widely. Social distancing meant that families could not get 
together, partners could not go out on a date, and roommates had to remain 
in their apartment together. Equally, school closures and home office regula-
tions required families to take on home schooling, provide workspace, and 
maintain family life. All these measures to combat the 2020 Coronavirus 
pandemic posed at least two challenges: These actions had to be performed 
persistently over a longer period and they were personally costly (e.g., 
increased loneliness causing discomfort or even mental health issues). It 
was therefore personally tempting for all of us to give up on our good 
intentions and start free riding on the effort of others, for instance, when 
younger people got together for so-called “Corona-Parties”. We assume that 
collective implementation intentions (cIIs) help focus on collective outcomes 
and therefore argue that We-if-then plans should help perform costly col-
lective actions. Such social dilemmas also provide an optimal context to 
investigate potential differences between individual and collective planning.
Planning to cooperate at a personal cost
Group interests and individual interests are often in conflict (Kerr, 1983, 
2013), and behaving in one’s group’s best interests in such situations requires 
individual sacrifices (Hardin, 1968). Resolving such social dilemmas is diffi-
cult (Komorita & Parks, 1995; J. M. Weber et al., 2004) because it is tempting 
to follow selfish incentives even when one has antagonistic group goals 
(Sheldon & Fishbach, 2011). For instance, even when a company has the 
goal to stick to the social distancing measures, it may be tempting to keep 
shops open to secure business. At the same time, unconditional cooperation 
may encourage others to take a free ride and defect. As Lewin (1939, p. 121) 
put it, “a man who does not show backbone [. . .] invites the bestiality of the 
mob”. With regard to groups, unconditional cooperation may encourage 
others to take a free ride and exploit the group. Conditional cooperation, 
such as tit-for-tat strategies in repeated interactions, is therefore the most 
adaptive behaviour in dilemma situations.
Recent research shows that if-then planning can activate the mental 
representation of a superordinate goal, and thereby help prioritise it over 
conflicting goals (Kirk et al., 2011; Stroebe et al., 2013). Moreover, if-then 
planning can promote actions that are personally costly (e.g., Hall et al., 2012; 
Trötschel & Gollwitzer, 2007; Nickerson & Rogers, 2010). We therefore 
assume that furnishing a cooperative group goal with a cII to focus on the 
group outcome can help prioritise group goals over selfish goals, even when 
this comes at a personal cost. Moreover, we assume that cIIs will create 
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a collective focus. This implies that cII effects ought to be specific to one’s 
group, promoting cooperative decisions within one’s group but not with 
outsiders. Similarly, we assumed that cIIs create a certain situation-response 
link. This implies that cII effects ought to be specific to the planned situation, 
promoting cooperative decisions in the specified situation but not in unre-
lated situations (cf. Masicampo & Baumeister, 2012). In short, cIIs should be 
able to promote conditional cooperation.
To test these predictions, Thürmer, wieber et al. (2020b) conducted an 
experiment with university students (N = 134). We developed an airline 
pricing game (based on Sheldon & Fishbach, 2011) that posed a dilemma 
between a collectively profitable choice that was individually unprofitable 
(cooperation) and an individually profitable choice that was collectively 
unprofitable (defection). To intensify this dilemma experience, participants 
were paid according to their decisions. Participants took on the role of an 
airline CEO to decide on the pricing of the airline’s tickets for different 
routes; they could either choose standard pricing (cooperate) or discount 
pricing (defect). Each route was also serviced by another airline that also had 
to chose between these two pricing options, and the outcome of both airlines’ 
decisions influenced each other in a prisoner’s dilemma game fashion (see 
Figure 4): If both airlines choose standard pricing, passenger numbers 
remain stable and both airlines earn good revenue. If one airline chooses 
discount pricing while the other one chooses standard pricing, however, 
most passengers take advantage of the discount pricing. Accordingly, the 
discount pricing airline earns maximum revenue and the standard pricing 
airline earns minimum revenue. Last, if both airlines choose discount pri-
cing, passenger numbers remain stable but both airlines earn lower revenue 
due to the lower ticket prices.
Importantly, participants’ airline was said to belong to an alliance of 
airlines, the Flugallianz. On alliance routes, the alliance would independently 
market some of the tickets and the revenue for each connection would be 
equally divided between the two airlines servicing the respective route (see 
Figure 5). We constructed the alliance pay-off matrices by subtracting equal 
amounts from each airline and displaying the sum in a separate alliance field. 
Since the alliance pay-off was divided 50–50 between both airlines, the actual 
pay-offs in the alliance case were identical to the individual matrices.
After reading thorough task instructions and passing comprehension 
checks, participants received a “decision training.” The training either con-
tained the cII “When we are about to make our pricing decision, then we will 
consider the Flugallianz’s revenue,” the II “When I am about to make our 
pricing decision, then I will consider my airline’s revenue,” or a neutral 
control plan, neither referring to the group, nor the individual: “When the 
decision screen appears, then a decision has to be made.” Participants then 
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played eight rounds of the airline pricing game against other airlines in the 
Flugallianz (i.e., group members).
As outlined above, we sought to test whether cII effects would spill over to 
(a) strangers and (b) structurally similar situations. To this end, participants 
played eight rounds of the airline pricing game against airlines not in the 
Flugallianz (i.e., non-group members; Figure 4). Then, a structurally similar 
investment task followed. In this hypothetical investment task (adapted from 
Fischbacher et al., 2001), each participant had 10,000 USD that could be 
invested in a common project account with another player or be kept in one’s 
own account, with the other player facing the same two choices. All con-
tributions to the common project account would be added, and each airline 
would receive 75% of the total amount. Investing was thus a good opportu-
nity to make money if both airlines contributed, but required trusting the 
other player to contribute equally. Dependent measures were the number of 
cooperative decisions (i.e., number of trials where standard pricing was 
chosen) in the alliance and the non-alliance pricing task as well as the 
money invested in the hypothetical investment game.
We first analysed the decisions in the airline pricing game. When playing 
against a group member, participants with the cII to consider the Flugallianz 
revenue cooperated more than participants with the II to consider their 
airline’s revenue or control participants with an unrelated plan (Figure 5). 















Figure 5. Incentivised Prisoner’s Dilemma game results: number of cooperative deci-
sions in incentivised airline-pricing game that participants had planned for with refer-
ence to their group. Error bars represent standard errors. II: Individual implementation 
intention, cII: collective implementation intention. Adapted from Thürmer, Wieber, et al. 
(2020b) based on the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
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for the individual. Note that participants were paid according to their 
decisions; participants with cIIs thus sacrificed some of their payment to 
support the group goal. But did cIIs increase cooperation with anyone? Our 
results indicate they did not: When looking at the decisions in rounds 
playing against strangers (i.e., airlines not in the Flugallianz), no difference 
between conditions emerged. One might wonder whether cIIs lead to unlim-
ited cooperation within groups. This could be problematic, for instance, 
when certain group members take advantage of the other members. The 
results from the structurally similar investment task suggest that this is not 
the case. Again, no cII effect emerged (Figure 6).
To sum up, the present study indicates that cIIs promote goal-directed 
cooperation within one’s group and in the situation planned for. These 
findings are key to the situation of a global pandemic. Cooperation with 
regard to the agreed-upon measures, such as staying at home instead of 
earning money or exercising one’s democratic right to demonstrate, was 
called-for and necessary. At the same time, as the pandemic went on, worries 
about excessive financial burden and limitations on democratic liberties 
increased. In this context, it is important to know that if-then planning 
with cIIs does not turn citizens into collectivist robots but rather supports 















Figure 6. Non-incentivised investment task results: amount of cooperative investment 
that participants had not planned for. Error bars represent standard errors. II: Individual 
implementation intention, cII: collective implementation intention. Adapted from 
Thürmer, Wieber, et al. (2020b) based on the Creative Commons Attribution License 
(CC BY).
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promotes strategic cooperation that is goal-directed and occurs in the situa-
tion planned for.
Planning to persist despite discomfort
Our research discussed so far used monetary incentives as a means to 
increase the relevance to participants, providing a major parallel to real- 
world decisions during a pandemic. However, even though money provides 
a powerful incentive (V. L. Smith, 1976), much of our life is not directly 
related to money. Moreover, for many of our decisions and actions, the 
consequences we might have to face are not even that clear. Will I contract 
the Coronavirus when I have a drink with a few friends in the park? Will 
I then infect others whom I love? And will they (or me) get really sick? All of 
these consequences are uncertain.
Such psychological reality (cf. Lewin, 1936) includes that some actions 
require persistence and are costly in the sense that they pose discomfort, and 
that this discomfort may easily derail goal striving. For instance, even when 
a parent had the goal to stick to the social distancing measures, it was 
tempting to have the kids play with the neighbours in the driveway to be 
able to get some work done (e.g., finish writing an important manuscript). Or 
a teenager who feelt the social pain of loneliness just had to meet friends, 
putting them at risk.
We (Thürmer et al., 2017) conducted a second set of experiments with 
university students (Exp. 1: N = 52 triads, i.e., 156 participants; Exp. 2: N = 41 
triads, i.e., 123 participants) that made cooperation costly in much the same 
way. Specifically, we used a well-established physical persistence task 
(adapted from Bray, 2004) where three group members have to hold 
a medicine ball. During such tasks, the group depends on each member 
(Kerr & Hertel, 2011; Kerr et al., 2007; B. Weber & Hertel, 2007): Whenever 
one member fails, the group fails. Moreover, failure is visible to every group 
member, imposing individual costs for giving up as well. However, holding 
a weight induces muscle pain soon before one’s physical strength is 
exhausted. This pain is uncomfortable and can lead to doubts whether one 
is able to persist much longer. All of this tempts performers to give up 
prematurely, imposing individual as well as collective costs. We argued 
that cIIs to ignore muscle pain and boost self-efficacy (i.e., telling oneself 
that one can do it) can help improve physical persistence. We added indivi-
dual planning conditions to explore the difference between individual and 
collective plans. As there are individual incentives to performing well, IIs 
should also improve performance; however, we assumed that cIIs would lead 
to a group focus and thus to different patterns of group interaction.
Groups of three all formed the goal to perform well and then engaged in 
a baseline persistence round. Before the second, experimental round, all 
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groups received strategies that are known to help deal with unpleasant states 
(Thürmer et al., 2013; Wieber et al., 2011) such as muscle pain. These 
strategies varied in their focus (individual vs. collective) and format (control 
vs. if-then), leading to individual conditions (II vs. individual control) and 
collective conditions (cII vs. collective control). II groups received the indi-
vidual if-then plan “And if my muscles hurt, then I will ignore the pain and 
tell myself: I can do it!” cII groups received the same if-then plan but in 
collective phrasing: “And if our muscles hurt, then we will ignore the pain 
and tell ourselves: We can do it!” and control groups received the same 
information in an individual or collective phrasing but not in an if-then 
format (i.e., “We [I] will ignore our [my] muscle pain and tell ourselves 
[myself]: We [I] can do it!”; [individual phrasing in brackets]). Besides 
performance (task persistence), we analysed verbal group interaction. 
Participants were free to talk as much or as little as they wanted, and we 
therefore expected to see differences in line with the task strategies that 
people decided to use.
As expected, both the II and the cII groups improved their performance in 
comparison to the respective control groups without an if-then plan (Figure 
7). This supports the assumption that individual and collective goal striving 
are possible in groups, and that both types of goal striving can be supported 
by respective if-then plans. Importantly, groups that had formed a cII com-
municated more than II groups as indicated by the number of words spoken 
during task performance. Groups that had formed a cII also used more first 
person plural pronouns (we, us ours) whereas II groups used more first 
person singular pronouns (I, me, mine). This pattern of results suggests that 
both IIs and cIIs can support performance but that they do so in different 
ways: While IIs support individual goal striving (e.g., little and self-centred 
interaction), cIIs support collective goal striving (e.g., more and group- 
centred interaction).
We only measured verbal interaction in this first experiment, leaving open 
whether interaction impacted performance or the other way round. To 
clarify the causal direction of our findings, we manipulated task commu-
nication in a second experiment also using interactive small groups. Our 
reasoning was as follows: If cIIs support collective goal striving, they should 
lead to better performance when the task is well suited for collective goal 
striving (e.g., encourages verbal interaction), and if IIs support individual 
goal striving, they should lead to better performance when the task is well 
suited for individual goal striving (e.g., prevents verbal interaction). We 
therefore manipulated whether communication was encouraged or pre-
vented during the persistence task. As predicted, the cII led to better perfor-
mance when participants were encouraged to communicate (e.g., faced each 
other and wore a headset around their neck) and the II led to better 
performance when participants could not communicate (e.g., looked away 
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from each other and wore a headset on their ears, Figure 8). Both experi-
ments are therefore in line with our assumptions that IIs support individual 
goal striving, that cIIs support collective goal striving, and that both types of 
implementation intentions can support group performance.
Our main finding that planning can increase persistence in uncomfortable 
group tasks is key for the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic. During the pandemic, 
people had to persist, even when this was uncomfortable. The personal, 
social, and economic costs of social distancing grew day by day, and the 
temptation to give up on it thus increased constantly. From this perspective, 
one may argue that it would be best to only emphasise the importance of 
social distancing to the individual (i.e., avoiding to get sick oneself). 
However, working in a group can be highly motivating, especially for those 
least capable (Kerr & Hertel, 2011; Köhler, 1926; Witte, 1989). What is more, 
recent individual-level studies on if-then planning and physical performance 
indicate mixed results. For instance, IIs to ignore physical exertion had no 
effect on performance and led to higher ratings of perceived exertion (Bieleke 
& Wolff, 2017) – but they also led to reduced cognitive activation in areas 
typically related to exerting self-control (i.e., the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex [DLPFC]; Wolff et al., 2018). Moreover, if-then planning was 
observed to improve endurance for those who believe that sports ability is 























Figure 7. Cooperative persistence, Experiment 1: Mean persistence scores (experimental 
[sec] minus baseline [sec]) by implementation intention and referent. Error bars repre-
sent standard errors. II: Individual implementation intention, cII: collective implementa-
tion intention. Adapted from Thürmer et al., (2017) based on the Creative Commons 
Attribution License (CC BY).
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et al., 2020). Lastly, our full-factorial design allowed us to compare the effects 
of We-if-then plans versus I–if-then plans in groups. While the effects of We- 
if-then plans apparently rely on group communication, the effects of I–if- 
then plans do not. In sum, recent findings indicate that the framing and the 
content of if-then plans are key to their success. If-then planning is thus not 
a “magic pill” or a quick fix but an intervention that needs to be applied 
skilfully. We return to this topic in the discussion.
Planning and curbing social influences
When it comes to implementing individual behaviours during crisis, the 
choices are to adapt and thrive or to hide and wane. While it is easy to 
proscribe to adaptive behaviours from a safe and cool distance, emotional 
and social pressures in the situation can lead to choosing behaviours that 
serve short-term needs but are maladaptive in the long run. During the 2020 
Coronavirus pandemic people saw themselves confronted with questions 
such as “Will I contract the virus?”, “Am I in danger?”, or “How will I do 
financially?” All these questions are not only threatening to one’s health and 
physical well-being but, more generally, to one’s sense of control and ability. 




















Figure 8. Cooperative persistence, Experiment 2: z-transformed persistence scores by 
implementation intention referent and communication. Error bars represent standard 
errors. II: Individual implementation intention, cII: collective implementation intention. 
Adapted from Thürmer et al., (2017) based on the Creative Commons Attribution 
License (CC BY).
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responses to protect this sense of ability may be quite maladaptive, such as 
finding excuses why one cannot thrive during the pandemic.
Moreover, as Robert Frank, an economist, points out with regard to 
regular health behaviour, “By far the greatest injury caused by someone’s 
decision to become a smoker is the harm caused by making others more 
likely to smoke as well” (Frank, 2020, p. 13). Frank thus highlights the 
enormous behavioural impact that observing others has on us. In the context 
of a pandemic, this implies that “bad examples”, or even just doing what used 
to be normal, can have a detrimental impact. For instance, people may find it 
hard not to shake hands when they meet their acquaintances. Moreover, 
observing others engaging in detrimental behaviours may encourage and 
justify behaving in this way oneself. For instance, one may be determined to 
stick to one’s shopping list but grab a few extra bottles of disinfectant when 
observing others hoarding this item. During the 2020 Coronavirus pan-
demic, such hoarding had widespread negative consequences such as 
a shortage of certain consumer goods (e.g., toilet paper) and crucial medical 
equipment (e.g., respiratory masks).
We argue that skilful self-regulation may empower individuals to protect 
their on-going pursuits against emotions of threat and unwanted social 
influences. Specifically, we focus on two prominent self-defeating behaviours 
(Baumeister & Scher, 1988; Kopetz & Orehek, 2015), creating excuses for 
poor performance instead of trying hard (Berglas & Jones, 1978; McCrea, 
2008) and acting in line with social norms that run counter to one’s goals 
(Cialdini, 2012; Sherif, 1936). What both of these phenomena have in 
common is that they protect one’s short-term interests (i.e., protecting 
one’s self-image of competence or adherence to group norms) but run 
counter to one’s long-term pursuits. In two sets of studies, we sought to 
test how planning can help individuals attain their goals in such difficult 
social contexts.
Planning to reduce self-handicapping
Facing important performance tasks can lead to questioning whether one can 
succeed, which gives rise to feelings of self-doubt and worry. While being 
unable to ensure success, having external reasons for poor performance at 
hand can at least soften the negative impact of failure on one’s self-image and 
help save face in front of others. Such excuse making seemed ubiquitous 
during the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, as even some presidents preferred to 
blame international organisations for the Coronavirus instead of working on 
their countries’ health care system. And excuse making was also obvious 
when joggers claimed that they were unable to slow down to keep a safe 
distance or elderly citizens arranged doctor’s visits so they encountered their 
friends.
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Excuse making has been studied extensively under the rubic of self- 
handicapping (Berglas & Jones, 1978; McCrea, 2008). Self-handicapping 
includes proclaiming hindrances to one’s performance, such as claiming 
that one is not feeling well (claimed self-handicapping) or actually creat-
ing performance hindrances, such as going out the night before an 
important exam (behavioural self-handicapping). What both behaviours 
have in common is that they preserve one’s perceived ability after failure, 
both in one’s own view and in the view of others (McCrea & Hirt, 2001). 
In comparison to merely claiming hindrances, creating actual performance 
obstacles has the advantage that the resulting excuses are highly valid (e.g., 
being hung over doubtlessly impairs exam performance) but at the same 
time are very costly (i.e., actually impaired performance). Men are more 
likely to exhibit behavioural self-handicapping than women (Hirt et al., 
2003), apparently because women, on average, place a greater value on 
effort (Hirt & McCrea, 2009; McCrea, Hirt, Hendrix et al., 2008; McCrea, 
Hirt, Milner et al., 2008). But even claiming obstacles to one’s perfor-
mance can have social costs such that people find self-handicappers 
unappealing (Hirt et al., 2003). Self-handicapping thus is a costly strategy 
to protect the self from implications of poor outcomes and deal with 
feelings of worry and self-doubt. Ideally, one would regulate these emo-
tions in other, less costly ways.
Implementation intentions help deal with detrimental emotions, with little 
if any costs attached (Schweiger Gallo et al., 2018, 2009; Webb et al., 2012). We 
thus predicted that forming an if–then plan helps individuals overcome their 
performance-related worries, thereby reducing self-handicapping behaviour. 
We (Thürmer et al., 2013) investigated this hypothesis in two laboratory 
experiments with university students (Exp. 1: N = 104 participants; Exp. 2: 
N = 130 participants). All participants formed the goal to perform well on an 
upcoming task and adopted strategies to reduce self-doubt and increase self- 
efficacy. The adopted strategies were either phrased in an if–then format 
(implementation intention: “And when I start with Part 2 of the study, then 
I will ignore my worries and tell myself: I can do it!”) or not (control: “I will 
ignore my worries in Part 2 of the study and tell myself: I can do it!”). The task 
in Part 2 was either described as an intelligence test (highly threatening) or as 
an assessment of perception style (less threatening). Participants then had an 
opportunity to claim a self-handicap (report undue life-stress in 
a questionnaire, Experiment 1) or behaviourally self-handicap (inadequately 
prepare for the task in Part 2, Experiment 2). As predicted, implementation 
intentions reduced claiming self-handicaps to levels observed in the low-threat 
control conditions (Figure 9). Experiment 2 demonstrated the reduction of 
behavioural self-handicapping among chronic self-handicappers (Figure 10), 
who chose to look at uninformative test-items instead of studying crucial task 
instructions for the upcoming intelligence test in Part 2.
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The social implications of these behaviours are clear: While creating self- 
handicaps allows “saving face” it hampers goal attainment and productivity, 
prevents learning, and reflects poor sportsmanship. In the context of the 
2020 Coronavirus pandemic, such behaviours could have been fatal, for 
instance, when people self-handicapped with regard to hygiene behaviours, 
social distancing, or hospital visits. Failing to adhere to these behaviours 
reduced feelings of threat but increased the chances of spreading the 
Coronavirus.
Planning to reduce automatic social influence
Making excuses helps maintain the self-image of being an able person in the 
face of others and therefore serves, to some degree, social purposes. 
However, others can also influence our behaviour much more directly, 
through the force of unwritten social rules that guide our behaviour, social 
norms (Cialdini, 2012; Sherif, 1936). Our second set of studies focuses on 
using if-then planning to curb such immediate social influences on impulse- 
buying (Thürmer, Bieleke et al., 2020). Impulse buying, that is, purchasing 
unplanned items during a shopping trip, was ubiquitous during the 2020 
Coronavirus pandemic. At the onset of the first shutdown, people in different 
countries started hoarding a variety of products, including hand sanitisers, 
dry foods, condoms and red wine, or even toilet paper. Rather than reflecting 
an increased need, many of the purchases seemed to be driven by the 
























Figure 9. Claimed self-handicapping, Experiment 1: reported stress sum-score by threat 
and implementation intention conditions. Reprinted by permission from Springer: 
Motivation and Emotion (Thürmer et al., 2013).
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“if I wait until next week there may be nothing left” (Brooks & Hay, 2020). 
These thoughts and feeling may be especially common when it comes to 
grocery shopping, as people often buy groceries for their family (Polegato & 
Zaichkowsky, 1994) and thus may feel responsible to secure supplies for their 

















































Figures 10. (a and b) Behavioural self-handicapping, Experiment 2: predicted practice 
index scores for (a) low behavioural self-handicapping individuals and (b) high beha-
vioural self-handicapping individuals. Reprinted by permission from Springer: 
Motivation and Emotion (Thürmer et al, 2013).
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(impulse buying) are very common when it comes to buying groceries (Park 
et al., 1989).
The observation or even just the expectation that others impulse buy may 
increase unplanned purchases. Young people have been observed to buy 
more unplanned products when they are around their peers whom they 
believe approve of impulse buying (Luo, 2005; Rook & Fisher, 1995). Such 
social norms apparently encourage giving in to buying exciting but 
unplanned items. In the context of the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, this 
would mean that the observation of a norm to hoard hand sanitisers lead to 
setting the goal to stock up on this item (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), which 
consequently lead to persistently seeking to acquire hand sanitisers (Carver 
& Scheier, 1998; Thürmer, Scheier et al., 2020).
In addition to normative influences that entail a deliberate decision, we argue 
that this social impact may also operate quite automatically and counter to set 
goals. Research by Serfas et al. (2016) supports this perspective. Participants 
decided whether products on a computer screen were on their shopping list for 
a dinner with friends. Tempting products attracted participants’ attention, as 
assessed via eye tracking, even when participants had the goal to focus on 
necessities only. Similarly, mere goals were found to be ineffective to decline 
an inappropriate request by a likable experimenter (Gollwitzer et al., 2011, Study 
2; Wieber et al., 2014, Study 2). Mere goal intentions thus are not sufficient to 
regulate implicit social influences, which may also promote impulse buying in 
a more automatic fashion and with little conscious deliberation.
This reasoning opens up the alarming possibility that people hoarded on 
impulse during the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, even when they had the goal 
to buy only what they really need. Merely convincing people to stick to their 
shopping lists was thus not sufficient to prevent shortages on certain items, 
such as hand sanitiser. How can people self-regulate their behaviour to stick to 
their goals, even when social pressures are rising? At the individual level, if- 
then planning creates strong situation-response links (Martiny-Huenger et al., 
2017; Webb & Sheeran, 2007; Wieber & Sassenberg, 2006) that help initiate the 
goal-directed response (then part) once the critical situation specified in the if- 
part is encountered. Perceptual effects of if-then plans can be observed within 
milliseconds after the specified situation (if-part) arises (Wieber et al., 2015b). 
In a sense, if-then plans strategically delegate action control to a cue in the 
environment, thereby helping to reach set goals (Gollwitzer, 2014). We con-
sequently argue that adding collective if-then plans (cIIs) to take only what one 
needs should further automate goal striving and thus help stick to one’s 
shopping list in social contexts.
To test this prediction, Thürmer, Bieleke, et al. (2020, Study 1) established 
two different group memberships among university students (N = 124) – one 
with a detrimental norm and one with a supportive norm. Qualitative and 
quantitative pretesting showed that students feel that they belong to the peer 
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group of their friends from home and their fellow student group of their 
friends from university, that both groups are important, but that they have 
different norms when it comes to shopping: While peers have an indulgence 
norm and support impulse buying (see also Luo, 2005), fellow students do 
not adhere to such a norm but instead prefer being frugal. In the first part of 
the main experiment, student participants read a text describing either 
typical student activities (e.g., meeting at a friend’s house to study together) 
or typical peer activities (e.g., meeting at a friend’s house to hang out 
together). In the second part of the experiment, participants first formed 
one of three plans before performing an impulse buying task (Table 3). cII 
participants formed a collective if-then plan constituting a useful strategy 
(“And if we want to put something in our shopping basket, then we will only 
take what we really need!”). Participants in one control condition received 
the same strategy but without having to form an if-then link (“We will only 
take into our shopping basket what we really need!”), and a second control 
condition received an if-then plan that contained all the relevant words but 
that did not constitute a helpful strategy (“And if we want something that we 
really need, then we will put it in our basket!”). Thereby, we sought to 
determine whether the if-then format alone contributes to cII effects. 
Participants’ task was to shop for dinner for their respective group (peers 
at home vs. fellow students) to prepare pasta with tomato sauce. Analysing 
the content of their shopping basket revealed that the cII indeed reduced 
impulse purchases in groups with but also without detrimental norms 
(Figure 11). Moreover, the if-then format further improved the effectiveness 
of the helpful strategy to take only what one needs. This finding suggests that 
the if-then format indeed contributes to cII effects.
Adolescents may be especially susceptible to social influences (Oettingen 
& Gollwitzer, 2015). We therefore conducted a second, large-scale survey 
study to investigate the correlates of impulse buying in a large sample 
(N = 773) of high-school students (Thürmer, Bieleke et al., 2020, Study 2). 
Table 3. Systematic variation of the wording of the self-regulation strategy (plan) in 
Study 1 Adapted from Thürmer, Bieleke, et al., (2020), based on the Creative Commons 
(CC BY 4.0) licence.
Strategy Content
Condition and Strategy Wording If-then format Useful strategy
Implementation Intention: 
“Whenever we want to put something in our shopping cart, 
then we will take only what we really need”
✓ ✓
Strategy-Control: 
“We will only put things in our shopping cart 
that we really need”
x ✓
If-Then-Control: 
“Whenever we want something that we really need, 
then we will put it in our shopping cart”
✓ x
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The automaticity of shopping with peers and peer expectations (i.e., injunc-
tive norms) emerged as predictors of impulse buying. In line with our 
reasoning that if-then planning can curb this influence, the plan condition 
moderated this relation: The correlations of automaticity and impulse pur-
chases as well as expectations and impulse purchases emerged in the control 
condition but were significantly weaker in the if-then planning condition, as 
indicated by significant interactions. In sum, cIIs can support goal-directed 
behaviour, even in the presence of detrimental norms.
With regard to the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, combating automatic 
social influences was important. People may have failed to realise that they 
were susceptible to automatic social influences, which easily derailed their 
goal striving. It is therefore not sufficient to convince people to stick to their 
shopping lists, keep a safe distance, and wash their hands properly (i.e., 
increase commitment to these goals); it is equally important to communicate 
to them that they need to specify when, where, and how they want to attain 
these goals, ideally in an if-then format. Preventing people from engaging in 
inherently pleasurable actions, such as meeting with friends or hugging, were 
among the most important immediate responses to the 2020 Coronavirus 
pandemic. A key contribution of our research pertains to preventing such 
detrimental actions (i.e., the focus rests on not acting). However, individual 
if-then plans are not always effective in reducing habitual unhealthy beha-
viours (Adriaanse, Gollwitzer, et al., 2011) and future research should there-
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Figure 11. Impulse buying under social influende, Experiment 1: number of unplanned 
items purchased by intention condition and peer influence (Study 1). Error bars repre-
sent standard errors. Adapted from Thürmer, Bieleke, et al. (2020), based on the Creative 
Commons (CC BY 4.0) licence.
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General discussion
The immediate response to the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic was social and 
behavioural, with responses including informed decision making in leader-
ship teams, cooperative behaviour in groups such as families, and goal- 
directed behaviour of individuals despite emotions of threat and undue 
social influence. Our programme of research on collective planning demon-
strates that a simple We-if-then plan (collective implementation intention, 
cII) can contribute much to mastering these tasks. First, teams with cIIs were 
more likely to integrate socially distributed information in their decisions 
and to consider temporally distributed information to later adjust their initial 
decisions. Second, group members with cIIs were more likely to cooperate at 
a personal cost and to persist despite discomfort to attain group goals. Third, 
individuals with IIs refrained from creating excuses for an upcoming threa-
tening task and shoppers with a cII managed to stick to their shopping list 
instead of yielding to automatic social influences on impulse buying.
Limitations and need for future research
Party politics seemed to play an undue role in the response to the 
Coronavirus pandemic. For instance, in a US state-level analysis of social 
distancing policy responses, political party affiliation emerged as the most 
consistent predictor for governors’ decisions to introduce social distancing 
measures (Adolph et al., 2020). This research raises the interesting question 
of how planning could help overcome partisan biases and lead to more 
impartial decisions in leadership teams. Research on partisan biases in 
individuals commonly takes a goal conflict perspective (Van Bavel & 
Pereira, 2018) and argues that situational and dispositional factors can 
skew information processing towards identity-conform conclusions. 
Accuracy is thus just one concern that political beings have with regard to 
evaluating information and making decisions; whether the received informa-
tion confirms one’s political orientation also matters. Our study on social 
dilemmas suggests that cIIs may help prioritise central goals and thus could 
be used to strengthen the goal to process all available information impar-
tially. It should be noted, however, that none of our studies included complex 
real-world scenarios or experienced decision-makers. Nevertheless, we did 
pay participants for their decisions in a number of studies, thus imposing 
stakes to participants. Moreover, most of our decision-making teams consist 
of people who went to a university, many of whom will become decision- 
makers during their career. It is therefore plausible that the positive effects of 
We-if-then planning translate to high-stakes decisions during the 2020 
Coronavirus pandemic (Thürmer, Wieber, et al., 2020a). Still, future research 
should test this assumption.
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Our research so far leaves open how multi-team systems or organisations 
can use if-then planning. Organisations benefit greatly from deliberately 
considering the best course of action, such as strategic planning, as well as 
swift action control, such as using routines (Pentland et al., 2012). If-then 
planning may be a way to combine both approaches, helping organisations to 
implement thoroughly deliberated decisions swiftly. In this regard, Gagné 
(2018) suggests that organisations may benefit from structuring their strate-
gic planning in line with the principles of collective if-then planning, a highly 
fruitful direction for future research.
Social groups such as families then need to implement many of the health 
behaviours proscribed in policy decisions. Our studies show that cIIs promote 
behaviours that are structurally similar to effective health behaviours (i.e., are 
personally costly or uncomfortable and require persistence). More direct 
evidence for the effectiveness of cIIs in promoting health behaviours comes 
from a recent correlational study (Lehmann et al., 2019). Collective if-then 
planning emerged as a powerful predictor for the effectiveness of a behavioural 
health intervention among staff nurses. Given that the principles of health 
behaviour change apply to private as well as professional actions alike (Michie 
et al., 2011), collective if-then planning should effectively support health- 
related behaviours in the general public as well as in professionals. Moving 
beyond an immediately available behavioural response, collective if-then plan-
ning could also support the implementation of pharmaceutical interventions 
once they become available. Compliance is key to pharmaceutical interven-
tions, and behavioural components may increase compliance. At the individual 
level, first evidence indicates the effectiveness of if-then planning in this regard 
(Jackson et al., 2006; O’Carroll et al., 2014; Trevisan et al., 2020). At the social 
level, such an intervention could for instance help shift norms towards accept-
ing vaccines thereby promoting lasting social change (Cialdini, 2012). 
Although this reasoning is speculative at this point, it represents a promising 
avenue for future research.
A related question concerns whether including other people in one’s plans 
is beneficial. As our research indicates, addressing the entire group is an 
effective means of promoting group goal attainment. Research on collabora-
tive implementation intentions indicates that if-then planning with a partner 
can promote health-goal attainment (e.g., breast self-examination; Prestwich 
et al., 2005; or exercise, 2012). Interestingly, the positive effects of collabora-
tive implementation intentions do not seem to extend to curbing unhealthy 
eating behaviour (Prestwich et al., 2014). Related research indicates that 
patients might use dyadic planning spontaneously, thereby assigning com-
plementary roles for goal attainment (Burkert et al., 2011; see also Scholz & 
Hornung, 2008). Future research should investigate whether this type of 
planning can also help people execute their roles within groups more 
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effectively and whether spelling out the complementary actions of different 
group members supports group goal attainment.
Our research has highlighted a number of interpersonal and group-level 
processes leading to cII effects but we have not investigated the associated 
micro-level intra-individual processes. In this regard, the neuro- 
physiological basis of cII effects seems particularly interesting. The neuro- 
physiological processes underlying if-then planning in individuals (Wieber 
et al., 2015b; Wolff et al., 2018) and spontaneous action planning at the 
dyadic level (Kourtis et al., 2019) are quite well understood. Linking both 
steams of research as well as using neuro-physiological measures during 
performance tasks (Wolff et al., 2019) would help understand the processes 
underlying cII effects. Understanding these processes in turn may facilitate 
crafting the most powerful interventions, tailored to the challenges at hand 
(Gollwitzer et al., 2010).
At the individual level, feelings of threat and anxiety steered coping 
responses during the Coronavirus pandemic. Our research on self- 
handicapping suggests that individual if-then planning can help mitigate 
such individual-level experiences of threat. Fruitful extensions of this line of 
research would include social consequences of threats as well as collective 
threats (i.e., to groups) and investigating how I-if-then plans vs. We-if-then 
plans help deal with these threats. For instance, recent research demonstrates 
that being confronted with negative expectations about a group one belongs 
to (i.e., stereotype threat) may reduce peoples’ social approach motivation 
(Martiny & Nikitin, 2019). Moreover, group members may engage in costly 
behavioural defences to protect their group against threatening out-group 
criticism (Thürmer & McCrea, 2018; Thürmer & McCrea, in principal 
acceptance; Thürmer et al., 2019). Future research should investigate how 
planning can mitigate these defensive responses to collective threats.
Regarding social influences, our research focuses on automatic remin-
ders of one’s social group. In real life, group members likely respond to 
behaviours that have an impact on them, thereby modulating future 
responses. Investigating this interplay between individual-level and 
group-level information processing in determining decisions and beha-
viour would be highly informative (Levine & Tindale, 2015). Moreover, 
unwanted social influence may stifle commitment to the superordinate 
goal, especially when others are not committed. One’s own commitment 
is a pre-requisite for if-then planning effects to occur, and many of the 
discussed behaviours also require the commitment and compliance of 
other people to be effective (e.g., people in one’s surrounding with 
regard to social distancing). In social contexts, it may therefore be 
important to (a) ensure one’s own commitment, and (b) convince others 
to commit to the same goals. With regard to ensuring one’s own 
commitment, goal setting (i.e., setting specific and challenging goals) is 
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highly effective (Locke & Latham, 1990, 2013) and also well-understood 
at the team-level (Kleingeld et al., 2011; Kramer et al., 2013). Recent 
evidence actually indicates that setting SMART goals jointly with 
a medical expert may be particularly effective in the health domain 
(Mann et al., 2016). With regard to influencing others, classic research 
indicates that if-then planning can help implement effective persuasive 
strategies at the right time (e.g., objecting to racist remarks quickly; 
Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). When We-if-than plans to remind 
each other of new behavioural norms are shared among the members 
of a larger social group, this may increase the acceptance and impact of 
social influence attempts. For instance, the goal to comply with social 
distancing recommendations could be supported by the plan “And if we 
notice that somebody is getting closer than 2 meters, then we ask them 
to keep a safe distance”. To our knowledge, research to date is mute to 
using collective plans in this way.
Translational impact and application
At least three key questions regarding using cIIs during the 2020 
Coronavirus pandemic remain open: 1) Do cIIs work in the field? 2) What 
are the costs, risks, and benefits of using cIIs?, and 3) How can cIIs be 
delivered to a large number of people? Our research has not addressed any 
of these questions directly but we can turn to related research to provide 
answers.
Implementation intention effects have been observed in a broad range of 
applied settings, including individual health behaviour (Adriaanse, Vinkers 
et al., 2011; Bélanger-Gravel et al., 2013; Vilà et al., 2017) and entrepreneurial 
decisions (Adam & Fayolle, 2015; van Gelderen et al., 2017). Moreover, 
although we conducted controlled experiments to assess causal effects, 
most of our studies include observations of actual behaviour. These beha-
viours had consequences to participants, including experiencing discomfort 
during a strenuous task or reduced remuneration. When it comes to general-
ising laboratory results to field setting, the observation of actual behaviour is 
key (Baumeister et al., 2010), especially in interacting groups (Moreland 
et al., 2010). Although we did not observe participants during their everyday 
life, it is thus likely that our results will have a translational impact.
The second question concerns the costs, risks, and benefits of forming 
cIIs. The up-front costs to the individual or team are small. Participants in 
our laboratory studies took about five minutes on average to form the 
respective goals and plans, using only pencil and paper methodologies. 
Even when assuming that an intervention in a field setting may require 
more explanation upfront, minimal time-investment is required. 
Concerning the risks, one may fear that if-then planning leads to rigidly 
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following a chosen course of action. This could prove detrimental, for 
instance, when the situation at hand changes (e.g., see our section “planning 
decisions to integrate temporally distributed information”). Indeed, in one 
study, individuals with if-then plans stuck to their chosen course of action 
and thus missed unexpected opportunities when they were under time 
pressure (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2012). However, a series of follow-up 
studies indicates that individuals manage to let go of maladaptive plans as 
soon as they receive performance feedback (Gollwitzer et al., 2008). What is 
more, a host of research indicates that the behavioural effects of if-then plans 
are contingent on commitment to the superordinate goal as well as the plan 
itself (Achtziger et al., 2012). In other words, if-then plans only impact 
behaviour when one wants them to (Legrand et al., 2017). With regard to 
cIIs, our study on social dilemmas (Thürmer, wieber et al., 2020b) indicates 
that cII-effects are situation-specific and group-specific, implying that they 
impact behaviour only in the designated manner. All these studies suggest 
that cIIs are safe to administer.
But what about the benefits of cII interventions? A concern may be that 
the effects of behavioural interventions are too small to actually make 
a difference in applied settings. However, a recent meta-analysis of meta- 
analyses found that if-then planning had a medium effect size, on average 
(d = .54; Keller et al., 2020). Although all these meta-analyses combine 
individual-level effects, the group-level studies reported in the present review 
yielded effects of similar size. As more evidence on the effectiveness of 
collective implementation intentions emerges, future meta-analyses should 
provide reliable estimates of their effect sizes. Yielding effects of this magni-
tude would indicate that cIIs could indeed be effective during pandemics, as 
they are comparable to typical effect sizes of pharmaceutical drugs on the 
diseases they target (Leucht et al., 2015). Moreover, even medical solutions 
such as using vaccines rely on behavioural compliance, and behavioural 
interventions such as cIIs can thus complement these medical approaches. 
In sum, a behavioural if-then planning intervention was readily available, 
could have been highly impactful, and used complementary to other 
approaches in curbing the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic.
Finally, during a pandemic, one would need a way to administer cII 
interventions to a large number of people at the same time. Translating 
basic research findings into large-scale interventions is no easy endeavour 
(Cohen & Sherman, 2014), as one needs to reach and engage people with 
minimal effort. One way to achieve this would be to administer planning in 
questionnaires at a large scale, much like we did in most of the studies 
discussed here. Another approach would be to have people develop their 
own plans, tailored to their current situations and goals. In this regard, 
mental contrasting with implementation intentions (MCII; review by 
Oettingen et al., 2013) could be a promising approach. During mental 
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contrasting, one contrasts fantasies about desired future outcomes with 
present obstacles (Oettingen, 2012). This combination ensures that plans 
address relevant obstacles for the individual. MCII effects were observed in 
intervention studies targeting stress reduction in medical students (Saddawi- 
Konefka et al., 2017), reducing meat consumption among university students 
(Loy et al., 2016), and preventing sleep procrastination (Valshtein et al., 
2020), among others. Moreover, a large-scale study demonstrated that 
MCII can help quitting smoking (Mutter et al., 2020). Pertinent to the 
context of population-wide interventions, MCII has been implemented in 
the freely available mobile-app WOOP (woopmylife.org; Oettingen, 2014). 
Taking a similar approach, cII interventions could be implemented in exist-
ing interactive platforms, such as Slack, Trello, or WhatsApp, or newly 
developed (governmental) apps. A potential limitation of such an approach 
is that people need to realise that they are facing an obstacle and what the 
obstacle is about. In the case of new situations, such as the 2020 Coronavirus 
pandemic, people would benefit from information about potential obstacles. 
Alternatively, public information campaigns or team trainings could include 
pre-formulated plans such as those used in the present research. These plans 
were effective in our studies and are likely to be effective in applied settings.
Conclusion
Journalists, writers, and politicians frequently seek to find positive sides to 
the difficult situation created by the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic. People 
helped each other, moved closer together, and realised what they can jointly 
achieve. The current research underscores and refines these intuitions. It is 
not only that we benefit from each other emotionally; planning collectively 
helps us to actively thrive and jointly attain our goals, even during the 
Coronavirus pandemic.
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